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ABSTRACT
This paper extends the literature on the evolution of norms with an
agent-based model capturing a phenomenon that has been
essentially ignored, namely that individual thought--or computing--is
often inversely related to the strength of a social norm.  In this model,
agents learn how to behave (what norm to adopt), but--under a
strategy I term Best Reply to Adaptive Sample Evidence--they also
learn how much to think about how to behave.  How much they’re
thinking affects how they behave, which--given how others behave--
affects how much they think.  In short, there is feedback between the
social (inter-agent) and internal (intra-agent) dynamics.  In addition,
we generate the stylized facts regarding the spatio-temporal evolution
of norms: local conformity, global diversity, and punctuated equilibria.Draft 3/1/99
Comments Welcome
Two         Features         of          Norms   
When I￿d  had my coffee this morning  and went upstairs to get
dressed for work, I never considered being a nudist for the day.  When I
got in my car to drive to work, it never crossed my mind  to drive on
the left.  And when I joined my colleagues at lunch, I did not consider
eating my salad bare-handed; without a thought, I used a fork.  
The point here is that many social conventions have two
features of interest.  First, they are self-enforcing behavioral regularities
(Axelrod 1984 and 1986, Young 1995, Lewis, 1969).  But second, once
entrenched, we conform without thinking about it.  Indeed, this is one
reason why social norms are useful;  they obviate the need for a lot of
individual computing.  After all, if we had to go out and sample people
on the street to see if nudism or dress were the norm, and then had to
sample other drivers to see if left or right were the norm, and so on,
we￿d spent most of the day figuring out how to operate, and we
wouldn￿t get much accomplished.  Thoughtless conformity, while
useful in such contexts, is frightening in others--as when norms of
discrimination become entrenched.  It seems to me that the literature
on the evolution of norms and conventions has focused almost
exclusively on the first feature of norms--that they are self-enforcing
behavioral regularities, often represented elegantly as equilibria of n-
person coordination games possessing multiple pure-strategy Nash
equilibria (Young 1993 and 1995, Kandori, Mailith, and Rob 1991).  
Goals
My  aim here is to extend this literature with a simple agent-
based model capturing the second feature noted above, that individual
thought--or computing--is inversely related to the strength of a social
norm.   In this model, then, agents learn how to behave (what norm to
adopt), but they also learn how much to  think about how to behave.
How much  they￿re thinking  affects how they behave, which--given
how others behave--affects how much they think.  In short, there is
feedback between the social (inter-agent) and internal (intra-agent)
dynamics.  In addition, we are looking for the stylized facts regarding
the spatio-temporal evolution of norms: local conformity, global
diversity, and punctuated equilibria (Young, 1998).
An          Agent-Based            Model             
This model posits a ring of interacting agents.  Each agent
occupies  a fixed position on the ring and is an object characterized by
two attributes.  One attribute is the agent￿s ￿norm,￿ which in this
model is binary.  We may think of these as ￿drive on the right (R) vs.
drive on the left (L)."  Initially, agents are assigned norms.  Then, of
course, agents update their norms based on observation of agents
within some sampling radius.  This radius is the second attribute and is2
heterogeneous  across agents.  An agent with a sampling radius of 5
takes data on the five agents to his left and the five agents to his right.
Agents update, or ￿adapt,￿ their sampling radii incrementally
according to the following simple rule:
Radius Update Rule
  Imagine being an agent with current sampling radius of r.  First,
survey all r agents to the left and all r agents to the right.  Some have L
(drive on the left) as their norm and some have R (drive on the right).
Compute the relative frequency of Rs at radius r; call the result F(r).
Now, make the same computation for radius r+1.  If F(r+1) does not
equal F(r), then increase your search radius to r+1
1.  Otherwise,
compute F(r-1).  If F(r-1) does  equal F(r), then reduce your search radius
to r-1.  If neither condition obtains (i.e., if F(r+1)=F(r)¹F(r-1)), leave
your search radius unchanged at r.  
Agents are ￿lazy statisticians,￿ if you will.  If they￿re getting a
different result at a higher radius (F(r+1)¹F(r)), they increase the
radius--since, as statisticians, they know larger samples to be more
reliable than smaller ones.  But they are also lazy.  Hence, if there￿s no
difference at the higher radius, they check a lower one.  If there￿s no
difference between that and their current radius (F(r-1)=F(r)), they
reduce.  This is the agent￿s radius update rule.     Having updated her
radius, the agent then executes the Norm Update Rule.
Norm Update Rule
This is extremely simple:  match the majority within your
radius.  If, at the updated radius, Ls outnumber  Rs, then adopt the L
norm.  In summary, the rule is: When in Rome, do as the (majority of)
Romans do, with the (adaptive) radius determining the ￿city limits.￿
This rule is equivalent to Best Reply to sample evidence with a
symmetric payoff matrix such as:
   L    R
L (1,1) (0,0)
R (0,0) (1,1)
Following Young (1995), we imagine a coachman’s decision to drive on
the left or the right.  "Among the encounters he knows about, suppose
that more than half the carriages attempted to take the right side of the
road.  Our coachman then predicts that, when he next meets a carriage
on the road, the probability is better than 50-50 that it will go right.
                                    
1 When we say ￿not equal￿, we mean the difference lies  outside some tolerance, T.  That
is, ½F(r+1)-F(r)½>T for inequality, and ½F(r+1)-F(r)½£T for equality.  For our runs,
T=0.05.3
Given this expectation, it is best for him to go right also (assuming that
the  payoffs are symmetric between left and right)."  The coachman
"calculates the observed frequency distribution of left and right, and
uses this to predict the probability that the next carriage he meets will
go left or right.  He then chooses a best reply,￿ which Young terms "best
reply to recent sample evidence."  Best reply maximizes the expected
utility (sum of payoffs) in playing the agent’s sample population
2. 
The departure introduced here is that each individual’s sample
size is itself adaptive
3.  In particular, as suggested earlier, once a norm
of driving on the left is established (firmly entrenched) real coachmen
don’t calculate anything--they (thoughtlessly and efficiently) drive on
the left.  So, we want a model in which "thinking"--individual
computing--declines as a norm gains force, and effectively stops once
the norm is entrenched.  Of course, we want our coachmen to start
worrying again if suddenly the norm begins to break down.  Of the
many adaptive individual rules one might posit, we will explore the
radius update rule set forth above.  
Overall, the individual￿s combined (norm and search radius)
updating procedure might appropriately be dubbed Best Reply to
Adaptive Sample Evidence.
Noise
 Finally, there is generally some probability that an agent will
adopt a random norm, a random L or R.   We think of this as a ￿noise￿
level in society.  
Graphics
With this set-up, there are two things to keep track of:  the
evolution of social norm patterns on the agent ring, and the evolution
of individual search radii.  In the runs shown below, there are 190
agents.  They are drawn at random and updated asynchronously.
Clearly, each agent￿s probability of being drawn k-times per cycle (190
draws with replacement) has the Binomial distribution B(n,1/n), with
n=190.  Agents who are not drawn keep their previous norm.  After 190
draws--one cycle--the new ring is redrawn below the old one (as a
horizontal series of small contiguous blue and yellow dots), so time is
progressing down the page.  There are two Panels.  The left Panel
                                    
2 For arbitrary payoff matrices, Best Reply is not  equivalent to the following rule:
Play the strategy that is optimal against the most likely type of opponent (i.e., the
strategy type most likely to be drawn in a single random draw from your sample).  For
our particular set-up, these are both equivalent to our "match the majority" update
rule.  These three rules part company if payoffs are not symmetric.
3 In best reply models, the sample size is fixed for each agent, and is equal across agents.
See Young (1996).4
shows the evolution of norms, with L-agents colored blue and R-agents
colored yellow.  Each entire Panel displays 275 cycles (each cycle, again,
being a sequence of 190 random calls.)  The right window shows the
evolution of search radii, with ￿hotter￿ colors for higher radii: Yellow
if r>=8; Red if r=6 or 7; Green if r=4 or 5; Blue if r=2 or 3, and Black if
r=1.  
Runs         of        the            Model       .
We present six runs of this model
4.  Once more, we are looking
for the stylized facts regarding the evolution of norms: Local
conformity,  global diversity, and punctuated equilibria (Young, 1998).
But we wish also to reflect the rise and fall of individual computing as
social norms dissolve and become locked in.  
                                    
4 A single random seed is used in all runs.5
Run         1.                     Monolithic        Social         Norm,       Individual        Computing          Dies           Out
For this first run, we set all agents to the L norm (coloring them
blue) initially and set noise to zero.  We  give each agent a random
initial search radius between 1 and 50 (artificially high to show the
strength of the result in the monolithic  case).  There is no noise in the
decision-making.  The uppermost line (the initial population state) of
the right graph (190 agents across) is multicolored, reflecting the
random initial radii.  Let us now apply the radial update rule to an
arbitrary agent with radius r.  First look out further.  We find that
F(r+1)=F(r), since all agents are blue.  Hence, try a smaller radius.  Since
F(r-1)=F(r), the agent reduces r to r-1.  Now, apply the norm update
rule.  At this new radius, match the majority.  Clearly, this is Blue, so
stay Blue.  This is the same logic for all agents.  Hence, on the left panel
of figure 1, the Blue social norm remains entrenched, and, as shown in
the right panel, individual "thinking" dies out--radii all shrink to the
minimum of 1 (colored black).
Figure 1.  Monolithic Norms Induce Radial Contraction
Norm Radius
Run         2.                    Random       Initial         Norms,       Individual        Computi       ng          At          Norm
Boundaries
With noise still at  zero, we now alter the initial conditions
slightly.  Rather than set all agents in the L norm initially, we give
them random norms.  In figure 2, we see the results.  6
Figure 2.  Local Conformity, Global Diversity
and Thought at Boundaries   
Norm Radius
In the left panel, there is rapid lock-in to a global pattern of alternating
local norms on the ring.  In the right panel, we see that deep in each
local norm, agents are colored black: there is no individual computing,
no "thinking,￿ as it were.  By contrast, agents at the boundary of two
norms must worry about how to behave, and so are bright colored.
Run         3.                  Complacency       in         New         Norms
In the 1960￿s, people smoked in airplanes, restaurants, and
workplaces, and no one gave it much thought.  Today, it is equally
entrenched that smoking is prohibited in these circumstances.  The
same point applies to other social norms (e.g., revolutions in styles of
dress) and to far more momentous  political ones (e.g., voting rights,
segregation of water fountains, lunch counters, and seats on the bus).
After the "revolution"  entirely new norms prevail, but once
entrenched, people become inured to them; they are observed every bit
as thoughtlessly (in our sense) as before.  I often feel that the same
point applies to popular beliefs about the physical world; these
represent a procession of conventions rather than any real advance in
the average person’s grasp of science.  For example, if you had asked
the average 14th Century European if the earth were round or flat, he’d
have  said "flat."  If, today, you ask the average American the same
question, you’ll certainly get a different response: "round."  But I doubt
that the typical American could furnish more compelling reasons for
his correct belief than our 14th Century counterpart could have
provided for his erroneous one.  Indeed, on this test, the "modern"
person will likely fare worse: at least the 14th Century "norm"  accorded
with intuition.  Maybe we’re going backward!  In any event, there was7
no "thinking" in the old norm, and there’s little or no thinking in the
new one.  Again, the point is that after the "revolution," new
conventions prevail, but once entrenched, they are conformed to as
thoughtlessly as their predecessors.  Does our simple model capture
that basic phenomenon?
In Run 3, we begin as before, with randomly distributed initial
strategies and zero noise.  We let the system "equilibrate," locking into
neighborhood norms (as before, these appear as vertical stripes over
time).  Then, at t=130, we shock the system, boosting the level of noise
to 1.0, and holding it there for ten periods.  Then we turn the noise off
and watch the system re-equilibrate.  Figure 3 chronicles the
experiment.
Figure 3. Re-Equilibration After Shock
Norm Radius
After the shock, an entirely new pattern of norms is evident on the
left-hand page.  But, looking at the right-hand radius page, we see that
agents who were thoughtlessly in the L norm (Yellow) before the shock
are equally thoughtlessly in the R norm (Blue) after, and vice versa. 
Run          4.            Modest          Noise        Level         and         Endogenous         Neighborhood         Norms
Now, noise levels of zero and one are not especially plausible.
What norm patterns, if any, emerge endogenously when initially
random agents play our game, but with a modest level of noise
(probability of adopting a random norm)?  This run and the next use
the same initial conditions as Run 2, but add increasing levels of noise.
With noise set at 0.15, we obtain runs of the sort recorded in Figure 4.8
Figure 4.  Moderate Noise and Endogenous Norms
Norm Radius9
Again, we see that individual computing is most intense at the norm
borders--regions outlining the norms.  We also see the emergence and
disappearance of norms, the most prominent of which is the yellow
island that comes into being at around t=500, and then disappears after
some 150 periods.  One can think of islands as punctuated equilibria.
We increase the noise level to 0.30 in Run 5.
Run         5.                   Higher         Noise         and         Endo         genous         Neighborhood         Norms
The result is a more elaborate spatial patterning than in the previous
run.  Again, however, we see regions of local conformity amidst a
globally diverse pattern.
Figure 5. Higher Noise and Endogenous Norms
Norm Radius
In this run, we see the emergence of a yellow island and later a blue
one, punctuated equilibria once more.
Run         6.                     Maximum         Noise          Does          Not       Induce           Maximum        Search    
Finally, we fix the noise level at its maximum value of 1.0,
meaning that agents are adopting the Left and Right convention  totally
at random.  One might assume that, in this world of maximum
randomness, agents would continue to expand their search radii until
the entire right graph of radii was yellow.  But this is not what
happens, as evident in figure 6.10
Figure 6.  Maximum Randomness in Norm Does Not   
Induce Maximum Search
Norm Radius
Thinking--individual computing--is minimized in the monolithic
world of Run 1.  But, it is not maximized in the totally random world
of this run.  A natural concluding question, then, is at what level  of
randomness--or other measure of macroscopic complexity--is it
maximized?
Summary
My aim has been to extend the literature on the evolution of
social norms with a simple agent-based model that generates the
stylized facts regarding the evolution of norms--local conformity,
global diversity, and punctuated equilibria--while capturing a feature of
norms that has been essentially ignored: that individual computing is
often inversely related to the strength of a social norm.  Obviously,
many refinements, sensitivity analyses, and further extensions are
possible.  But the present exposition meets these immediate and
limited objectives.11
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